Approaching Psychology’s Current Crises by Exploring the Vagueness of Psychological Concepts: Recommendations for Advancing the Discipline

Abstract

Psychology is currently facing a multilayered crisis stemming from the fact that the results of many psychological studies cannot be replicated (replication crisis), that psychological research has neglected cross-cultural and cross-temporal variation (universality crisis), and that many psychological theories are ill-developed and underspecified (theory crisis). In the present article, we use ideas derived from debates in theoretical and philosophical psychology as a basis for responding to all three crises. In short, we claim that psychological concepts are inherently vague in the sense that their meanings and the rules for their application are indeterminate. This does not imply that psychological concepts are ineffable or lack meaning. It implies, however, that hoping to arrive at a finite set of necessary and sufficient criteria that define psychological concepts once and for all is an illusion. From this, we deduce four recommendations for responding to psychology’s crises. First, we argue that the replication crisis could be approached by paying more attention to the context conditions under which psychological realities and knowledge about these realities are being created. Second, we claim that the universality crisis can be alleviated by putting more effort into exploring variability across times and cultures. Third, we contend that acknowledging the language dependence of psychological research could be a fruitful way of addressing the theory crisis. Last, we show that embracing theoretical and methodological pluralism would be an antidote against psychology’s crises in general.