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On the interpretation of bribery in a laboratory corruption game: moral frames and social norms

Ritwik Banerjee

Experimental Economics, 2016. DOI 10.1007/s10683-015-9436-1

Has this study been replicated?

The atlas records 1 replication of this study. Recorded outcomes: 1 failed. The earliest on record is from 2026.

Replications

• SCORE new data replication of Banerjee (2016), Parsons et al. (2026). Outcome recorded: failed. This claim was not replicated. Outcome read from OSF report.

Cite this record

Banerjee, R. (2016). On the interpretation of bribery in a laboratory corruption game: moral frames and social norms. Experimental Economics, 19(1), 240–267. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-015-9436-1

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