Bargaining, Nuclear Proliferation, and Interstate Disputes
Has this study been replicated?
The atlas records 1 reproduction of this study. Recorded outcomes: 1 mixed.
Reproductions
- Reproduction (with author data & code): Gartzke & Jo (2009, Journal of Conflict Resolution), Fox et al. (2020). OSF. Outcome recorded: computationally reproducible, robustness not checked.
Computational: Reproduction result: Nuclear-capable states are more likely to be recognized by other nations (Coefficient on Nuclear Weapons A term = 0.168 [0.1%]; SE = 0.033) — identical to the focal test/original result.
Outcome read from Computational: Reproduction result field. View paper
Cite this record
Gartzke, E., & Jo, D.-J. (2009). Bargaining, Nuclear Proliferation, and Interstate Disputes. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 53(2), 209–233. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002708330289
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